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CORPORATIONS-THE EFFECT OF UNANIMOUS
APPROVAL ON CORPORATE BYLAWS-Blount v. Taft, 295
N.C. 472, 246 S.E.2d 763 (1978).
Much Ado About Nothing?
INTRODUCTION
Minority shareholders in a close corporation traditionally have
been concerned about the protection of their interests-e.g., control,
management, voting effectiveness, distribution of earnings and res-
olution of disputes. This group frequently has sought to safeguard
its interest through the use of agreements regulating the activity of
all the shareholders. In Blount v. Taft, I the North Carolina Supreme
Court has presented the minority shareholder with both a possible
new alternative and an additional cause for concern. The court in
that case found a bylaw to be a shareholders' agreement solely be-
cause it was unanimously adopted by the shareholders and even
though no evidence of mutual intent among the shareholders to
make such an agreement was shown. It then held the agreement
subject to the amendment provisions contained in the bylaws. This
note briefly surveys the subject of shareholders' agreements in close
corporations and discusses the impact and practical consequences
of the Blount decision.
THE CASE
Eastern Lumber and Supply Company (hereinafter "Eastern")
was a closely held North Carolina corporation whose shares were not
"generally traded in the markets maintained by securities dealers
or brokers." ' Eastern's stock was held by the members of three
families. The Blount family group owned 41% of Eastern's outstand-
ing stock. Defendants Taft owned 41%; and defendant McGowan,
18%.
In 1969, plaintiffs concern about the nepotism which existed
within the corporation led to a motion at a directors' meeting to
require unanimous approval by the shareholders before any rela-
tives or shareholders could be employed by the corporation. This
motion was defeated by the defendants.
At a special joint meeting of all the directors and shareholders
of Eastern on August 20, 1971, new bylaws were unanimously
1. Blount v. Taft, 295 N.C. 472, 246 S.E.2d 763 (1978).
2. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1975)'
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adopted. Included therein was a provision, Article III, Section 7,
which created an Executive Committee of the directors. Each fam-
ily was to be represented on the committee, and the bylaws required
unanimous approval by the Executive Committee prior to employ-
ment of any individual.3 Another provision, Article VIII, Section 4,
provided for amendment or repeal of the bylaws by an affirmative
vote of a majority of the board of directors.4 At no time during the
meeting did anyone suggest that Article III, Section 7 was anything
other than a bylaw. The minutes of the August 20, 1971, meeting,
including the bylaws mentioned above, were approved unanimously
at a shareholders' meeting on September 13, 1971.
In June of 1974, the board of directors adopted new bylaws,
with the Taft and McGowan directors outvoting the Blount repre-
sentatives. These bylaws deleted the provisions of the 1971 bylaws
relating to (1) representation by each of the three families on the
Executive Committee and (2) unanimous approval of employee hir-
ing by the Executive Committee.
After defendants employed persons to work for the corporation
without the consent of the Blount directors,' plaintiffs brought this
action for specific performance of the 1971 bylaws, specifically Arti-
cle III, Section 7. Plaintiffs asserted that this provision constituted
a shareholders' agreement because it had been unanimously
adopted by the shareholders. The Superior Court of Pitt County,
3. Article III. Board of Directors . .. . Section 7. Executive Commit-
tee. The Board of Directors may, by the vote of a majority of the entire
board, designate three or more directors to constitute and serve as an
Executive Committee, which committee to the extent provided in such
resolution, shall have and may exercise all of the authority of the Board
of Directors in the management of the corporation. Such committee shall
consist of one member from the family of M. K. Blount, Sr., one member
from the family of E. H. Taft, Jr., and one member from the family of Ford
McGowan. Minutes of all such meetings shall be kept and a copy mailed
to each member of the Board of Directors and action of the committee
shall be. submitted to the Board of Directors at its next meeting for ratifi-
cation.
The Executive Committee shall have the exclusive authority to em-
ploy all persons who shall work for the corporation and that the employ-
ment of each individual shall be only after the unanimous consent of the
committee and after interview.
Blount v. Taft, 295 N.C. at 475-76, 246 S.E.2d at 766.
4. "Article VIII. General Provisions .... Section 4. Amendments. Except as
otherwise herein provided, these bylaws may be amended or repealed and new
bylaws may be adopted by the affirmative vote of a majority of the directors then
holding office at any regular or special meeting of the Board of Directors." Blount
v. Taft, 295 N.C. at 475, 246 S.E.2d at 765.
5. Record at 5, Blount v. Taft, 295 N.C. 472, 246 S.E.2d 763 (1978).
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sitting without a jury, found that Article III, Section 7 of the bylaws
adopted on August 20, 1971, was a valid shareholders' agreement
which could not be amended as provided by Article VIII, Section 4
of said bylaws.
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated and
remanded, holding that the bylaws in question did not constitute a
shareholders' agreement.'
On discretionary review,' the North Carolina Supreme Court
upheld the result of the court of appeals, but on different grounds.
That court held that the entire set of bylaws of August 20, 1971,
constituted a shareholders' agreement and was subject to the
amendment provisions of Article VIII, Section 4 contained therein.8
BACKGROUND
The North Carolina Business Corporation Act' is "one of the
most liberal in the extent to which it expressly permits the normal
control and management of a corporation to be restructured"
through the use of shareholders' agreements.' 0 A valid, written
agreement among shareholders may effectively regulate the control
and management of a close corporation in a manner similar to that
of a partnership." No longer is it impermissible for shareholders to
be "partners inter sese and a corporation as to the rest of the
world."" Investors can, through the use of shareholders' agree-
ments, "adopt the decision-making procedures of partnership, avoid
the consequences of majority rule (the standard operating procedure
for corporations), and still enjoy the tax advantages and limited
liability of a corporation." '' 3
6. Blount v. Taft, 29 N.C. App. 626, 225 S.E.2d 583 (1976), aff'd, 295 N.C. 472,
246 S.E.2d 763 (1978).
7. The plaintiffs' first petition for discretionary review was denied by the
North Carolina Supreme Court on September 1, 1976. A petition for a rehearing of
the denial of the previous petition for discretionary review, including inter alia an
affidavit from Dean Elvin R. Latty, one of the drafters of the North Carolina
Business Corporation Act, was filed with the Supreme Court in a manner not
expressly provided for by the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. In his
affidavit, Dean Latty expressed his opinion that "the narrow technical construction
of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) by the Court of Appeals violates the intent of its
draftsmen for that statute to be a Magna Carta for close corporations."
8. Blount v. Taft, 295 N.C. 472, 246 S.E.2d 763 (1978).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 55 (1975).
10. R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 7-1, at
139-40 (2d ed. 1974).
11. Id., § 7-7, at 149.
12. Jackson v. Hooper, 76 N.J. Eq. 592, 599, 75 A. 568, 571 (1910).
13. Blount v. Taft, 295 N.C. at 481, 246 S.E.2d at 769.
19791
3
Currin: Corporations - The Effect of Unanimous Approval on Corporate Byla
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1979
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
An agreement among shareholders may be embodied "in the
charter or bylaws or in any side agreement in writing and signed by
all the parties thereto."' 4 Close corporation statutes of several juris-
dictions have borrowed the language of the North Carolina statute; 5
however, none of these jurisdictions have considered the questions
of whether a bylaw also may be a shareholders' agreement solely by
virtue of its unanimous approval by the shareholders, and if so, how
the bylaw/shareholders' agreement may be amended or repealed.
By statute, 6 non-initial corporate bylaws "may be adopted,
amended or repealed either by shareholders or by the board of direc-
tors.""7 If the shareholders adopt the bylaws, however, they may be
amended only by the shareholders unless otherwise provided in the
bylaws themselves.' Additional restrictions regarding bylaw
changes may be imposed pursuant to the statute which authorizes
(1) the limitation or elimination of "the power of the board of direc-
tors to adopt, amend or repeal the bylaws or any specific bylaw"' 9
or (2) a requirement of greater than majority vote for the adoption,
amendment or repeal of a bylaw.20 Furthermore, bylaws changing
the statutory requirement for action by directors may be adopted,
"amended or repealed only by shareholders acting pursuant to any
...greater vote so prescribed."2'
The negative phrasing of the statute regarding shareholders'
agreements22 reflects the flexibility and liberal attitude of the Busi-
ness Corporation Act in this area. Shareholders' agreements should
be construed and enforced so as to allow the express intent of the
parties to control unless the agreements "violate the express charter
or statutory provision, contemplate an illegal object, involve .. .
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1975).
15. CAL. CORPORATIONS CODE ANN. § 300(b) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 354 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.107 (West 1977); KAN. STAT. § 17-7214 (1974);
MD. CORP. & Ass'NS. CODE ANN. § 104 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1385 (Purdon
Supp. 1978-79); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-11-220 (1977).
16. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(a) (1975).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(a)(4) (1975).
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(b) (1975). See also R. ROBINSON, supra note 7,
at § 4-8.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(a)(2) (1975). In Blount, the plaintiffs were pre-
cluded from the benefit of this statute because the bylaw appearing in Article III,
Section 7 was both enacted and amended prior to the effective date of the 1973
amendment of that subsection (October 1, 1973). 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws, ch. 469,
ss. 4, 47. A discussion of the effect of this statute on situations where it may be
applied is found in the text following note 41, infra.
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-73(b) (1975).
[Vol. 1:153
4
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 7
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol1/iss1/7
SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS
fraud, oppression or wrong against other shareholders, or are made
in consideration of a private benefit to the promisor."23
ANALYSIS
To fully understand the decision of the supreme court, it is
helpful to analyze the rationales of the trial court and the court of
appeals.
The trial court, through Judge James, held that only Article III,
Section 7 of the 1971 bylaws was a shareholders' agreement 2 though
all of the bylaws were adopted at the same time and by unanimous
vote. The court further concluded that as a shareholders' agree-
ment, it required the unanimous consent of all the shareholders for
amendment or repeal.2 5 The plaintiffs having refused to consent, the
court found that the shareholders' agreement was not validly re-
pealed and that plaintiffs were entitled to specific enforcement of
the agreement. 2 The trial court gave no effect to the amendment
provision contained in Article VIII, Section 4 of the bylaws.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reasoned that in order for
a shareholders' agreement to be incorporated into the bylaws,
N.C.G.S. § 55-73(b), by implication, required the prior existence of
the shareholders' agreement.27 "There is no provision in the Busi-
ness Corporation Act that the by-laws of a corporation, or any one
or more of the by-laws, becomes a shareholders' agreement solely
because of unanimous adoption thereof by the shareholders. ' 21
Finding no competent evidence to support the trial court's conclu-
sions that Article III, Section 7 was a shareholders' agreement which
could not be amended by Article VIII, Section 4, the court of appeals
held that the trial court erred in granting plaintiffs specific perform-
ance of Article III, Section 7.29
In the petition for rehearing, Dean Latty's affidavit 30 posited
that the construction given N.C.G.S. § 55-73(b) by the court of
appeals violated the draftsmen's intent for that statute. Dean
Latty's concern was that the requirement of "a previous agreement
or .. .the explicit designation as a shareholders' agreement
23. Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 129, 136 S.E.2d 569, 575 (1964).
24. Record at 155, Blount v. Taft, 295 N.C. 472, 246 S.E.2d 763 (1978).
25. Id. at 158.
26. Id. at 157.
27. Blount v. Taft, 29 N.C. App. at 630, 225 S.E.2d at 586.
28. Id. at 631, 225 S.E.2d at 586.
29. Id. at 633, 225 S.E.2d at 588.
30. See note 4 supra.
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[would] manufacture technicalities and set traps for unwary busi-
ness operators."3'
The supreme court apparently found merit in Dean Latty's
position. Nearly twenty months after oral arguments, 32 the court
held that not only Article III, Section 7, but the entire set of bylaws
adopted in 1971, constituted a shareholders' agreement because
unanimously adopted by the shareholders. 33 However, the entire set
of bylaws/shareholders' agreement was subject to the amendment
provisions of Article VIII, Section 4.34 Having been amended pro-
perly pursuant to the latter section, there was no breach of the
agreement by the defendants, and plaintiffs were not entitled to
specific enforcement.
CONCLUSION
What effect does this decision have on the operation of the
North Carolina close corporation in the future? Will minority share-
holders find the desired protection of their interests in unanimously
adopted bylaws which will be construed to be shareholders'
agreements? The answer is "not necessarily."
According to the Blount court, whenever bylaws are adopted
unanimously, they will be deemed to constitute a shareholders'
agreement even though there was no overtly expressed intent to that
effect. But at that point the assurance to the minority group may
end. If the bylaws/shareholders' agreements contain an internal pro-
vision allowing amendment or repeal by the affirmative vote of a
majority of the directors, as was the case in Blount, this provision
controls, and the minority again may find itself subject to the will
of the majority. Only by having an internal provision which requires
the unanimous vote of the shareholders to amend or repeal the
bylaw/shareholders' agreement will the minority shareholders find
the protection which they sought and believed they had. "Requiring
the insertion of such an amendment provision works no undue hard-
ship on the parties if all are agreed upon its inclusion. ' '35
The court, per dictum, alluded to the situation where there was
no provision within the bylaws/shareholders' agreements governing
31. Petition to Rehear at 21, Blount v. Taft, 295 N.C. 472, 246 S.E.2d 763
(1978).
32. Oral arguments were heard in January, 1977; the supreme court filed its
decision on August 29, 1978.
33. Blount v. Taft, 295 N.C. at 485, 246 S.E.2d at 771.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 487, 246 S.E.2d at 773 (citation omitted).
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amendments.3 1 What, if any, protection will the minority share-
holders find in that situation? The court reasoned that because
the shareholders chose to embody the shareholders' agreement in
the bylaws, "it must be concluded that they intended for these
[statutory or common law] norms [regarding amendment] to
apply absent an expressed intention to deviate from them. 3 By
statute,38 bylaws adopted by shareholders may not be amended or
repealed by the board of directors unless the bylaws grant this au-
thority. Such authority being absent, a bylaw/shareholders' agree-
ment adopted in this manner is subject to amendment "by the
affirmative vote of the shareholders entitled to exercise a majority
of the voting power of the corporation. ' 3 Consequently, the protec-
tion which the minority believed it had is non-existent.
The logical extension of the rationale of the Blount court would
indicate that the foregoing discussion of the effect of unanimity with
regard to the adoption of bylaws would apply with equal force to the
unanimous adoption of charter provisions. When the
charter/shareholders' agreement contains a provision regarding
amendment or repeal, that provision will control. However, a share-
holders' agreement embodied in a charter having no internal
amendment provision would be subject to amendment or repeal by
"the affirmative vote of the holders of at least a majority of all the
outstanding shares entitled to vote thereon, unless any class of
shares is entitled to vote thereon as a class, in which event" the
statute specifies the procedure to be followed. 0 The statutory safe-
guard4' itself suggests the minority group's solution to protect its
interest-i.e., include a provision requiring unanimous vote for
amendment or repeal of the shareholders' agreement/charter provi-
sion.
As the Blount court pointed out, the minority shareholders were
precluded from the benefit of N.C.G.S. § 55-16(a)(2) (1975),42 be-
36. Id. at 486, 487, 246 S.E.2d at 772.
37. Id. at 486, 246 S.E.2d at 772.
38. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(a)(1) (1975).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT: § 55-16(b) (1975) (emphasis added).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-100(b)(3) (1975).
41. Id.
42. § 55-16. Bylaws.-(a) The initial bylaws may be adopted by the
board of directors at its organization meeting. Thereafter bylaws may be
adopted, amended or repealed either by the shareholders or by the board
of directors, but ... (2) Any bylaw changing the statutory requirement
for a quorum of directors or action by directors as permitted by G.S. 55-
28(d), or changing the statutory requirement for a quorum of shareholders
or action by shareholders, as permitted by G.S. 55-65 and 55-66, may be
1979]
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cause Article III, Section 7 of the bylaws was both enacted and
amended prior to the effective date of the 1973 amendment to that
statute's subsection.'3 Had plaintiffs been able to argue this stat-
ute, the result in this case might have been different. Article III,
Section 7 changed the statutory requirement for action by the direc-
tors, as permitted by N.C.G.S. § 55-28(d) (1975), by requiring the
unanimous vote of the Executive Committee in the area of employ-
ment practices of the corporation. Therefore, this bylaw would re-
quire the affirmation of the shareholders by this greater vote-i.e.,
unanimity-for amendment or repeal where this statute is effec-
tive."
It would seem unlikely that a well-drawn bylaw or shareholders'
agreement would lack an amendatory provision such that the statu-
tory norms for amendment would come into effect. For this reason,
the impact of the Blount decision upon minority shareholders may
be insignificant indeed. Even if a bylaw does not contain an amen-
datory provision, the Blount decision may well be insignificant for
two additional reasons. (1) Practically, it will be seldom that the
majority shareholders will allow the adoption of a requirement of
unanimity. (2) The benefit of N.C.G.S. § 55-16(a)(2) (1975) may
well prevent the harsh result felt by the minority shareholders in
Blount as to any bylaws enacted since 1973.
Margaret Person Currin
adopted only by the shareholders, and any such bylaw can itself be
amended or repealed only by the shareholders acting pursuant to any
different quorum and greater vote so prescribed . . ..
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(a)(2) (1975).
43. 295 N.C. at 487, 246 S.E.2d at 773.
44. It must be carefully noted that not all bylaws regarding quorums and
action by directors or by shareholders are covered by this statute. The bylaw must
change a statutory requirement as permitted by N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-28(d), 55-
65 or 55-66 (1975).
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